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WHO IS REALLY BEING PROTECTED BY REGULATION OF THE 
COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY?: IMPLICATIONS OF AMERICAN 
TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO. V. CENTRAL OFFICE 
TELEPHONE, INC. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the growth of the Internet and the World Wide Web, cellular 
telephones, and traditional telephone service, the communications industry is 
one of the fastest growing industries in the world.1  Early on, like industries 
preceding it, the unregulated communications industry met with public 
resistance due to perceived unfair pricing practices.2  State legislatures 
responded to the public outcry by passing laws that regulated the rates that 
communications companies could charge for services.3  Soon, however, the 
industry grew beyond the scope of local and state regulations, and Congress 
acted to regulate the growing national communications industry.4  This initial 
regulation quickly proved to be inadequate to address the still-growing 
communications industry.5  Finally, Congress drew on its experience with 
regulation of the transportation industry, and passed the Communications Act 
of 1934 (“Communications Act”).6  The Communications Act required 
common carriers in the telecommunications industry to file rate tariffs that 
precisely described the allowable rates for services.7  The Communications Act 
 
 1. THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 6 (Charles P. Cozic ed., 1997). 
 2. See JOHN F. STOVER, AMERICAN RAILROADS 97 (2nd ed. 1997) indicating that 
merchants, farmers, and communities pushed for government regulation of the railroad industry 
because of discrimination in freight rates.  See also LEONARD S. HYMAN ET AL., THE NEW 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: EVOLUTION AND ORGANIZATION 73 (1987) where, in 
response to customer complaints about cost and service, the Indiana legislature in 1885 passed a 
law regulating the price of telephone service. 
 3. See ALAN STONE, WRONG NUMBER: THE BREAKUP OF AT&T 48 (1989).  By 1921, 
forty-five of the forty-eight states had established Public Utility Commissions to regulate the 
telephone industry. 
 4. Id. Congress passed the [Mann-Elkins Law in 1910], which subjected the telephone 
industry to federal rate jurisdiction, overseen by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). 
 5. Id. The [Willis-Graham Act was passed in 1921], which extended the jurisdiction of the 
ICC to telephone company mergers and acquisitions. 
 6. HYMAN, supra note 2, at 86.  The Communications Act of 1934 created the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) to regulate the telephone industry’s interstate and foreign 
business. 
 7. 47 U.S.C. § 203(a). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
346 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:345 
has been held by the Supreme Court to supercede any state law claims 
concerning matters related to the regulation of the telecommunications 
industry.8  This was also the holding in the recent Supreme Court case, 
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc. 
(“AT&T”).9  While upholding the supremacy of the Communications Act over 
state law attempts to regulate the industry, AT&T also established a pathway 
allowing state law contract and tort claims to be superseded under the guise of 
a relationship to regulation of the communications industry. 
This note will first examine the development and history of the 
Communications Act.  Next, it will outline the factual history and lower court 
decisions in the case.  It will then discuss the majority, the concurrence, and 
the dissenting opinions in AT&T.  Finally, this note will examine the 
implications of the AT&T decision to the communications industry and to the 
public. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Regulation of Industries 
At the turn of the century, both the transportation and the communications 
industries were expanding rapidly across the United States.10  With the growth 
of these industries, the public demanded regulation to stop the unreasonable 
and discriminatory application of rates by the industries.11  Congress complied 
with the public’s wishes by passing the Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”) in 
1887, which regulated the more mature transportation industry.12  As the 
communications industry also matured, Congress passed the Communications 
Act of 1934 (“Communications Act”), and applied the same rules to the 
communications industry that it had developed and applied to the 
transportation industry through the ICA.13  Both of these acts provided similar 
filed-rate doctrines, requiring common carriers to file tariffs describing all of 
 
 8. See, e.g., Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571 (1981) where the damages 
in a state law breach of contract case were barred by the filed rate doctrine of the 
Communications Act. 
 9. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1956 
(1998). 
 10. See STOVER, supra note 2, at 81-82.  The railroads were building to the Pacific coast, 
and railroad companies had received land grants of 170 million acres from the federal 
government.  See also HYMAN, supra note 3, at 88-91 showing an increase in the number of 
telephones installed each year throughout the late 1800s and early 1900s. 
 11. STOVER, supra note 2, at 97; HYMAN, supra note 2, at 73. 
 12. See STOVER, supra note 2, at 123.  [The Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”)] required that 
all interstate rates be “reasonable and just”. 
 13. HYMAN, supra note 2, at 86.  The Communications Act, like the ICA, required that 
service be provided at “reasonable charges”. 
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their rates and charges so that the public could determine what the proper rates 
were.14 
1. Interstate Commerce Act – Regulation of Transportation 
By the late 1800’s, railroad transportation had become the primary means 
of transporting goods across the United States.15  Major railroad companies 
controlled the railroad cars, and therefore controlled the flow of goods across 
the country.16 
In markets served by more than one railroad company, the competition to 
attract customers was fierce.  Railroad companies engaged in price wars, 
accepting miniscule profits in order to attract customers.17  Many railroads in 
these markets did not survive the competition, and were either taken over or 
driven out of business by more financially secure companies.18 
However, in markets where there was no competition among railroads, the 
opposite occurred.  Rates for transporting goods in these markets were 
unreasonably high.  With no alternative available, manufacturers would pay 
the high shipping rates, and pass the cost along to the consumers in the form of 
higher prices for goods.19 
The combination of the rate wars in areas with competition, and the 
artificially high rates in areas with no competition resulted in inconsistent 
pricing for similar shipping.20  Manufacturers and consumers demanded 
federal action in order to regulate the transportation rates.  In response, 
Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 (“ICA”).21  The ICA 
provided for rate schedules to be published and regulated, and required 
 
 14. See STOVER, supra note 2, at 123.  [The Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”)] required that 
all rate schedules for railroad services be published.  See also 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) 
(Communications Act) requiring telephone common carriers to publicly display and file their rate 
schedules. 
 15. MAURY KLEIN, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE RAILROAD IN AMERICAN LIFE 15-16 
(1994).  Railroads transported iron, coal and cotton, transforming the textile, food, and mail order 
businesses. 
 16. STOVER, supra note 2, at 96.  The railroads possessed a “complete monopoly” of the 
nation’s commercial freight and passenger movement. 
 17. Id. at 108-109.  Rate wars occurred when rival railroads operated or competed for the 
same service areas.  Rate wars were further aggravated by bankrupt rail companies, or those in 
receivership, charging artificially low rates. 
 18. KLEIN, supra note 15, at 25-26. 
 19. Id. at 124-125.  Two different rates structures for shipping had developed.  One rate 
applied to local, noncompetitive traffic, and a second rate for through, or competitive traffic. 
 20. Id. 
 21. The [Cullom bill in the Senate] and the [Reagan bill in the House] were combined into 
the Interstate Commerce Act, which President Cleveland signed into law on February 4, 1887.  
STOVER, supra note 2, at 123. 
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common carriers to file tariffs that detailed the charges for services.22  With 
regulation provided by the ICA, shipping rates were published, and the general 
public was able to ascertain the proper shipping rates for a given route.23  This 
virtually eliminated the price wars and uneven rates, and restored public 
confidence in the transportation industry.24 
2.  Communications Act of 1934 – Regulation of Communication 
As the transportation industry had developed and expanded in the United 
States, the telecommunications industry was similarly developing.25  By the 
time that ICA regulation of the transportation industry became mature, 
Congress had already responded to public concern about the communications 
industry and passed the Mann-Elkins Act in 1910.26  The Mann-Elkins Act 
regulated the rates that telecommunications companies could charge for their 
services.27  In addition, the Mann-Elkins Act established the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (“ICC”) as a governing board for the communications 
industry, and imposed an obligation on telecommunications common carriers 
to provide service at “just and reasonable rates.”28 
The booming telecommunications industry, however, outpaced the power 
of the ICC’s regulation, and companies such as American Telephone & 
Telegraph expanded across the country.29  Unlike the railroad industry, 
telephone companies were considered to be primarily local industries, and the 
existing federal regulation was ineffective.30  When it became obvious that the 
communications industry was no longer merely a local concern, Congress 
passed the Communications Act.31 
 
 22. Id. at 123.  The bill also established the Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) to 
administer the Act. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 123-124, noting that the public reaction to the regulation was generally favorable.  
Additional confidence was instilled when President Cleveland appointed five capable men to the 
newly founded ICC. 
 25. HYMAN, supra note 2, at 88-91, showing that the telephone industry was growing at over 
four times the rate of the general economy. 
 26. STONE, supra note 3, at 48.  The Mann-Elkins Act extended the jurisdiction at the ICC 
and gave it the power to federally regulate the telephone industry. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See STONE, supra note 3, at 48.  See also Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, ch. 309, §7, 36 Stat. 
539 (1910). 
 29. STONE, supra note 3, at 48. 
 30. See STONE supra note 3, at 48, where most telephone litigation concerned local rates or 
service.  The inability to regulate the large companies, such as AT&T, was at issue in several 
major proceedings. 
 31. STONE, supra note 3, at 48.  See also HYMAN, supra note 2, at 86, quoting the 
Communications Act of 1934’s purpose [o]f regulating interstate and foreign commerce in 
communication”. 
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The Communications Act was intended to regulate the public telephone 
and communication system.32  Drawing on its experience with the ICA, 
Congress incorporated many of that Act’s provisions into the Communications 
Act.33  In addition, Congress added provisions to create the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) as a government agency to govern the 
communications industry.34  As with the ICA, the Communications Act 
required carriers to file tariffs, or a schedule of charges, classifications, 
regulations, and practices.35  The Communications Act further required prior 
notice for tariff rate changes, and also mandated that common carriers file and 
charge rates solely in accordance with published schedules.36  Just as the ICA 
had regulated the transportation industry and restored public confidence in the 
rate system, the Communications Act similarly regulated the communications 
industry. 
B. Early Decisions 
In both transportation and communication cases, the Supreme Court has 
consistently upheld the validity of both the ICA and the similar 
Communications Act filed-tariff requirements. 
In Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Kirby, the Court dismissed a breach of 
contract case against a railroad based on preemption by the ICA.37  There, a 
railroad had agreed to ship a group of racehorses on a particular fast train.38  
When the shipment did not take place on that train, the shipper of the horses 
instituted a breach of contract claim against the railroad.39  The Court found 
that the agreement to use a specific train for transporting the horses was an 
agreement for a special service, which was not provided for in the published 
tariff.40  Since the purpose of the published tariff was to avoid giving an 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. See 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) incorporating the requirements to publicly display and file rate 
schedules, just as the ICA had required the transportation carriers to also display and file such 
schedules. 
 34. HYMAN, supra note 2, at 86. 
 35. 47 U.S.C. § 203(a). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U.S. 155, 166 (1912). 
 38. Id. at 162.  Several different trains and routes were available to ship the livestock.  
However, the route that ensured arrival in the shortest time was preferred.  An agreement was 
made to deliver the horses via the “Horse Special”, a fast stock train that ran only three times a 
week. 
 39. Id. at 162-163.  The horses did not ship via the “Horse Special”, they were in fact 
shipped via a later and slower train, causing the horses to arrive forty-eight hours later than 
anticipated.  This later arrival prevented the horses from being put into proper condition for a 
planned sale. 
 40. Id. at 165. 
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advantage to one shipper that would not be extended to all, the Court found the 
contract for the special shipping to be invalid.41 
Similarly, in Davis v. Cornwell, the Court held that a promise by a carrier 
to provide a group of railroad cars on a specified day was invalid.42  Again, the 
Court found that the promise to provide the cars on a specific day was an 
advantage to one shipper that was not extended to all, and was not allowed for 
in the published tariff.43  The Court therefore found the agreement to provide 
the cars to be invalid because the ICA preempted it.44 
Likewise, in communications cases, the Court has applied the filed-rate 
doctrine of the Communications Act, just as it has applied the doctrine of the 
ICA to transportation cases. 
In MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph 
Co., the Court reiterated the validity of section 203 of the Communications 
Act, including the filed-rate doctrine.45  Quoting from an earlier case, the Court 
stated, for better or worse, the Act establishes a rate-regulation, filed-tariff 
system for common-carrier communications, and the Commission’s desire “to 
‘increase competition’ cannot provide [it] authority to alter the well-established 
statutory filed rate requirements.”46 
The Court has been consistent in allowing the filed-rate doctrine in both 
the ICA and the Communications Act to preempt any agreements made outside 
of the context of the filed tariff.  In both transportation and communications 
cases, the Court has followed the intent of the acts to provide uniform, 
published rates that the public can access to determine the proper charges for a 
carrier’s services. 
 
 41. Id. at 166.  The purpose of the Commerce Act was to establish reasonable rates and 
uniform application of those rates.  This purpose would be defeated if any advantage were given 
to one particular shipper.  The Court found that allowing a shipper to specify the use of a 
particular fast train was an advantage given to one that was not given at all.  This was not 
allowable unless the particular rates and shipping methods had been described in the published 
and filed rate schedules. 
 42. Davis v. Cornwell, 264 U.S. 560, 562 (1924).  Cornwell ordered empty cattle cars to be 
ready for his use on a particular day.  When they were not provided on that day, he sued for 
damages for failure to provide the cars. 
 43. Id. at 562.  The Court compared this case to Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Kirby, and 
found that the promise here to provide empty cars on a particular day was similar to the promise 
in Kirby to provide use of a particular train.  The Court found that the promise of availability on a 
particular day was not provided for in the published tariff, and was therefore preempted by the 
tariff. 
 44. Id. at 562. 
 45. 512 U.S. 218 (1994).  AT&T alleged that MCI was collecting unpublished rates for 
providing long distance service, in violation of the Communications Act.  Id. at 234.  The Court 
affirmed the finding of the Court of Appeals, and held that carriers must comply with the filed-
rate doctrine of 47 U.S.C. § 203(a). 
 46. Id. at 234, citing Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 118, 135 
(1990). 
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III. AT&T V. CENTRAL OFFICE TELEPHONE 
A. Summary of Facts 
American Telephone & Telegraph Company (“AT&T”) is a long-distance 
service provider, and as such, they are considered to be a common carrier 
under the Communications Act.47  In addition to providing long distance 
services to its own customers, AT&T also sells its long distance services to 
resellers, who in turn sell the long distance service to their customers. Central 
Office Telephone, Inc. (“COT”) is a reseller of long distance services.  COT 
purchases long distance service from providers such as AT&T, and then resells 
the service to its customers at a profit.48 
In 1989, AT&T offered a long distance service called Software Defined 
Network (“SDN”) service.  Among its features, SDN allowed the reseller to 
offer the long distance service to small businesses and residences, rather than 
just to large businesses.  Since SDN service required large volume 
commitments from resellers, the rates for SDN were typically lower than the 
rates for other long distance services.  In addition to the SDN service, AT&T 
offered several billing options to the reseller, including an option called 
Multilocation Billing (“MLB”) whereby AT&T would directly bill the 
reseller’s customers for the SDN service, with the reseller remaining ultimately 
responsible for all payments.49  As required by the Communications Act, 
AT&T filed tariffs with the FCC defining the rates for its long distance 
services, including its SDN service.  The filed tariffs not only defined the 
service rates, they limited AT&T’s liability for non-willful misconduct.50 
After implementing the SDN service, orders from resellers increased and 
AT&T had delays in actually providing the SDN service.  In addition, AT&T 
experienced “suppressed billing”51 problems which resulted in some customers 
not receiving bills for long distance calls until one year after they had made the 
calls.  In response to these problems, AT&T limited the number of new SDN 
 
 47. See American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 
1956, 1960 (1998); See also 47 U.S.C. 153(10) defining common carrier; See also 47 U.S.C. § 
203(a). 
 48. American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 
1956, 1960 (1998). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1960-1961.  The agreement between the parties stipulated that the service would be 
provided pursuant to the rates, terms and conditions as set forth in AT&T’s filed tariffs, and that 
the filed tariffs would govern both parties’ obligations. 
 51. See Central Office Telephone, Inc. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 108 F.3d 
981, 987 (1997).  “Suppressed billing” occurs when the billing system cannot immediately 
register a call to a particular customer.  The calls are lumped into an unbilled toll group until a 
billing guide is set up, then the customer is billed for all of the past unbilled calls. 
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customers it would accept, and transferred the handling of reseller customers to 
a new customer service center.52 
On October 30, 1989, COT entered into a contract with AT&T to purchase 
SDN service, which it planned to resell to its customers.  In addition, COT 
chose the MLB option, allowing AT&T to directly bill COT’s customers for 
the SDN service.  AT&T promised that the initial SDN service would be set up 
in four to five months, and additional service requests would be processed 
within 30 days.53 
In April 1990, COT began reselling the SDN service, and encountered 
immediate problems.  There were delays in starting up the SDN service for its 
customers, as well as suppressed billing problems.  In addition, COT 
customers were being billed incorrectly by AT&T.  AT&T was billing under a 
different plan than the one that COT had selected.  This resulted in customers 
receiving one hundred percent of the discount that COT was receiving from 
AT&T for volume purchases, rather than the fifty percent discount that COT 
intended.  In October 1990, COT switched from the MLB direct billing plan to 
a plan where COT received the entire bill for COT’s SDN service directly from 
AT&T.  COT then individually billed its customers for the SDN service.54 
COT continued to resell the SDN service, but it was unable to fill its 
commitment to AT&T for usage in the first contract period.  AT&T also said 
that COT owed them $200,000 in bills for the period in which COT was under 
the MLB building plan.  COT then informed AT&T that it was terminating its 
contract as of September 30, 1992, one and one-half years prior to the 
expiration of the contract.55 
On November 27, 1991, COT filed suit against AT&T alleging breach of 
contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and 
tortious interference with contract.56 
B.  District Court Opinion 
In Central Office Telephone Company, Inc. v. AT&T, the district court jury 
returned a verdict of $13,000,000 in favor of COT for its breach of contract 
and tortious interference with contract claims.57  Additionally, the jury found in 
favor of COT on AT&T’s counter-claim for $200,000 in unpaid charges.58 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 
1956, 1961 (1998). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id.  The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. 
 57. Central Office Telephone Inc. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 108 F.3d 981, 
988 (1997).  The judgment was entered on July 1, 1994. 
 58. Id. 
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The district court rejected AT&T’s argument that the state law contract and 
tort claims were preempted by the filed tariff doctrine of §203(a) of the 
Communications Act.  Instead, the court found that AT&T’s interpretation of 
the filed-rate doctrine was too broad and that the doctrine did not preempt 
COT’s state law claims.59  The court reasoned that since COT was complaining 
only about the manner in which AT&T acted, and not disputing the validity of 
the doctrine of the rates set in the tariff, that the filed-rate doctrine did not 
apply.  The court also rejected AT&T’s claim that there was no substantial 
evidence that any of its conduct was within the tariff’s meaning of willful 
misconduct.60 
The court, however, denied COT’s request to present evidence of AT&T’s 
financial condition to support its claim for punitive damages.  It then granted 
AT&T partial judgment as a matter of law, and omitted COT’s damages for the 
period after September 1992, since the evidence did not support damages for 
that period.61  In addition, the court denied AT&T’s motions for a new trial and 
remittitur, and held that as a matter of law, the filed-rate doctrine did not 
preempt COT’s claims.62 
C.  Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the district 
court, except the decision not to submit punitive damages evidence to the jury.  
The decision was reversed, and the case was remanded on that issue.63 
The court rejected AT&T’s claim that COT’s state law claims were 
preempted by the Communications Act.64  AT&T asserted that the tariff-filing 
requirement of the Communications Act is “Congress’s chosen means of 
preventing unreasonableness and discrimination in charges . . . the tariff-filing 
requirement is the heart of the common-carrier section of the Communications 
Act.”65 
The court found, however, that the billing option originally chosen by COT 
was not covered by the filed-rate doctrine, as was testified to by AT&T’s tariff 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 988-989. 
 62. Id. at 988. 
 63. Central Office Telephone, Inc. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, 108 
F.3d 981, 994 (1997). 
 64. Id. at 990.  The court found that the filed-rate doctrine could not apply to any of COT’s 
claims with regard to billing, even if it could apply to other aspects of the SDN service. 
 65. Id. at 989. 
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expert at trial.66  The court found that the filed-rate doctrine could therefore not 
apply to any of COT’s claims regarding that billing.67 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether COT’s state 
law claims were preempted by the federal filed-rate requirements of the 
Communications Act.68  The Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit, 
finding that COT’s state law claims were preempted by the Communications 
Act.69 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Court Opinion 
Justice Scalia delivered the majority opinion.  First the majority considered 
the intent of the Communications Act, and examined the nature of special rates 
and privileges covered by the Communications Act.70  They next analyzed 
COT’s claims and determined their origin.71  They concluded that COT’s state 
law claims were derived from their contractual relationship with AT&T, and 
that COT’s claims were therefore preempted by §203 of the Communications 
Act.72 
1. The History and Intent of the Communications Act 
The majority first looked to the history and development of the 
Communications Act.73  The Communications Act required every common 
carrier to file tariffs of charges with the FCC, describing all charges and 
conditions affecting those charges.74  In addition, §203(c) of the Act made it 
illegal to allow any special privileges or charges, unless specified in the 
published tariff.75  The Communications Act modeled its provisions on the 
earlier Interstate Commerce Act, which regulated transportation carriers.76  The 
 
 66. Id. at 990.  AT&T’s expert testified that the provisions of the tariffs do not apply 
between AT&T and the reseller (COT), but between AT&T and the end user. 
 67. Id. 
 68. 47 U.S.C. §203(a) is the “filed-rate” section of the Communications Act. 
 69. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1956, 
1965 (1998). 
 70. Id. at 1962.  Looking at 47 U.S.C. §§ 203(a) and 203(c), the Court traces the history of 
the “filed-rate doctrine”, and its application in several cases involving rate disputes. 
 71. Id. at 1964 where the Court is determining whether the claims in question were “wholly 
derivative” of the tariff agreement. 
 72. Id. at 1965. 
 73. Id. at 1962. 
 74. Id. at 1962; See also 47 U.S.C. § 203(a). 
 75. See 47 U.S.C. § 203(c) which addresses the similar problems seen in prior transportation 
cases where special rates or privileges were given to one shipper but not to another. 
 76. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1956, 
1962 (1998). 
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goal of both of these Acts was to prevent unreasonable and discriminatory 
charges.77 
The majority then examined several prior cases where the filed-rate 
doctrine had been held to be the only lawful charge,78 even if a common carrier 
intentionally misstated its rate and a customer relied on that 
misrepresentation.79  While recognizing the perceived harshness of this rule,80 
the majority cited MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & 
Telegraph Co. where the Court explained that maintaining nondiscriminatory 
rates is the goal of the Communications Act, and that the filed rate doctrine 
was “the heart of the common-carrier section of the Communications Act.”81 
The majority further explained that these discriminatory privileges can 
come in many forms, and did not have to simply be discounted rates.82  Citing 
Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Kirby, the majority concluded that any special 
privileges not spelled out in the tariff can be a violation of the Communications 
Act.83 
2. The Communications Act Applied to COT’s Claim 
The majority next examined the state law claims that COT levied against 
AT&T and whether those claims were preempted by the Communications 
Act.84  The majority concluded that the issues raised by COT – the 
representations made by AT&T concerning fast hookup time for the SDN 
service, the allocation of billing charges, and other matters – were precisely the 
subjects specifically addressed by AT&T’s filed tariff.85  The majority found 
that COT’s tort claim derived only from the contractual relationship with 
AT&T.86 
The majority further explained that guarantees of times for establishment 
of service, and agreements to allocate charges in a particular way, are in “flat 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id., citing Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981) and United 
States Nav. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474, 481 (1932). 
 79. Id. at 1962.  See also Kansas City Southern R.R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U.S. 639, 653 (1913). 
 80. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1956, 
1963 (1998). 
 81. Id., citing MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 
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 82. Id. at 1963. 
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contradiction” to the tariff. 87 Noting that COT’s claims are the very types of 
claims that the Communications Act was meant to preempt, the majority cites 
Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern R.R. Co. where the Court stated that “[t]he 
rights as defined by the tariff cannot be varied or enlarged by either contract or 
tort of the carrier.”88 
Finally, the majority dismisses COT’s argument that §414 of the 
Communications Act dictates a different result, and that the relief awarded by 
the jury below is consistent with the tariff.89  The majority cites long-held 
cases holding that §414 of the Communications Act90 preserves only those 
rights that are not inconsistent with the filed-tariff requirements.91 
The majority reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, and held that 
COT’s state law claims were preempted by the filed rated doctrine of the 
Communications Act.92 
B. Concurring Opinion 
Chief Justice Rehnquist provided his perspective in the concurring opinion.  
The concurrence expanded on the majority’s finding that the tortious 
interference was “wholly derivative of the contract claim”, and was therefore 
barred by the filed-rate doctrine.93 
Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that this “wholly derivative” finding 
was necessary to prevent COT’s tort claim from proceeding.94  The filed-rate 
doctrine’s purpose is to ensure that the tariff sets the terms by which the 
common carrier provides services to its customers.95  Chief Justice Rehnquist 
also noted that it is crucial to recognize that this is the only relationship that the 
tariff controls.96  Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that in order for 
the filed-rate doctrine to work correctly, it only needs to preempt suits that 
seek to alter the terms and conditions set forth in the tariff.97  Citing Chicago & 
Alton R.R. Co. v. Kirby and Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern R.R. Co. as 
cases where parties sought special treatment or special rates in violation of the 
 
 87. Id. at 1964. 
 88. Id. at 1965. 
 89. Id. 
 90. 47 U.S.C. § 414, the saving clause of the Communications Act duplicates the saving 
clause of the ICA which preserves only those rights that are not inconsistent with the statutory 
filed-tariff requirements. 
 91. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1956, 
1965 (1998).  See also Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 507 (1913). 
 92. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1956, 
1965-1966 (1998). 
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tariff’s filed rates.98 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that this case was similar.  
Here, as in the cited cases, COT attempted to enforce an agreement with terms 
different than those set forth in the tariff.99  Therefore, as in the cited cases, the 
filed-rate doctrine should bar such a claim.100 
Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the filed-rate doctrine does not 
control the entire relationship between the common carrier and its 
customers.101  The doctrine exists only to ensure that the filed rates are the 
exclusive source of the terms for providing services.102  It cannot act as a shield 
against all state law claims, only against those claims that derive from the 
tariff.103 
C. Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that COT’s tort claim 
stands separately from the contract claim, and was therefore not preempted by 
the filed-rate doctrine.104  The dissent agreed with the majority that the tort 
claim would be barred by the filed-rate doctrine if it were “wholly derivative of 
the contract claim”.105  However, the dissent points out that the jury’s finding 
on this tort claim was supported by evidence that went well beyond, and 
differed in nature from, the contract claim.106 
The dissent pointed out that while the majority was correct in stating that 
the filed-rate doctrine would preempt some tort claims, the Court has never 
before applied that doctrine to bar relief for conduct so far removed from the 
relationship governed by that doctrine.107 
 
 98. See Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U.S. 155 (1912), where a promise to 
provide a particular fast train for shipment was found to be in contradiction of the filed tariff, and 
therefore unenforceable.  See also Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern R.R. Co., 260 U.S. 156 
(1922) where an antitrust complaint challenging the rate that was filed and the tariff was 
disallowed. 
 99. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1956, 
1966 (1998). 
 100. Id. 
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 103. Id. 
 104. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1956, 
1967 (1998). 
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 106. Id.  The dissent argues that if AT&T had included a letter in each bill it sent that 
characterized COT as unethical, then that tortious conduct would certainly not be defendable 
under the filed-rate doctrine.  Similarly, the dissent argues, the information that AT&T did send 
out to COT’s customers showing COT’s markup on their bills should not be defendable under 
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 107. Id. at 1968. 
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Furthermore, the dissent distinguished this case from the precedents relied 
upon by the majority.108  COT’s tort claim never challenged the filed-rates as 
in Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern R.R. Co., and it does not seek special 
services as in Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Kirby and Davis v. Cornwell.109  
The dissent sees this case as being analogous to Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 
Inc., where the court held that a common-law tort claim could coexist with the 
Federal Aviation Act.110 
Finally, the dissent was troubled that the majority’s holding essentially 
closed the door to state law tort claims for tortious interference with business 
relations merely because the relationship involved a common carrier.111  The 
dissent pointed out that in this case, at least some of the interference occurred 
independently of the customer-carrier relationship.  Therefore, there would 
have been a sustainable action even if the contract had never been entered 
into.112 
V. IMPLICATIONS 
The implications of the Court’s decision in this case are subtle, yet 
potentially far-reaching.  On first examination, the Court seemed to simply 
uphold the longstanding preemption authority of the filed-rate doctrine of the 
Communications Act.  However, on closer examination, the Court appears to 
have broadened the scope of that doctrine. 
The Court in AT&T found that the claim of tortious interference was 
“wholly derivative” of the regulated contract claim,113 rather than an 
independent claim, and was therefore preempted by the filed-rate doctrine.  As 
Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, the jury in the district court found 
that AT&T had acted willfully and intentionally in interfering with COT’s 
business relations.114  This, he maintained, established that the tortious conduct 
of AT&T was not merely derivative of the contract violations, it was 
independent conduct that should not be afforded protection by the 
Communications Act provisions.115  The Court, however, held that the conduct 
of AT&T was derivative of the regulated relationship, and that the claim was 
superceded by the filed-rate doctrine. 
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With this holding, the Court provides an opening that future defendants 
may take advantage of.  Defendants in communications cases involving 
common carriers will certainly attempt to use the holding in AT&T as a shield 
from liability for their actions.  While previous cases provided for rate and 
provision agreements to be superceded by the filed-rate doctrine, this case 
allows conduct that is beyond that relationship to also be preempted by the 
doctrine.  The holding in AT&T provides great incentive for establishing that 
the defendant’s activities were merely somehow related to the regulated 
contractual relationship.  If defendants can establish this relationship, they can 
use the preemptive authority of the Communications Act and the holding in 
AT&T as a shield, and dismiss any state-law claims against them. 
As the communications industry expands, with telephone, cellular, and 
even Internet communication continuing to grow exponentially, many more 
consumer and communications companies will enter into agreements for 
services.  While parties will likely adhere to the terms of these agreements, 
there will certainly be cases where conflicts occur as to the terms of the 
agreement, or the conduct of the parties to the agreement.  The 
Communications Act and the filed-rate doctrine exist to regulate the properly 
charged rates and the terms of communications agreements.  Under the filed-
rate doctrine, any agreements contrary to the filed tariffs will be superceded, 
and only the published, filed tariff rates will apply.  However, under AT&T, the 
conduct of the parties, however egregious, may also be regulated by the 
Communications Act and the filed-rate doctrine.  Even tortious conduct, if 
somehow related to the contractual agreement, may be superceded by the 
Communications Act.  Consumers are likely to be the losers, as 
communications companies seek protection for any of their tortious conduct 
behind the shield of the Communications Act. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The decision in AT&T is not dramatic, yet it will likely be far reaching.  
While the decision upholds the preemptive power of the filed-rate doctrine of 
the Communications Act, it also arguably extends that power beyond its 
previous reach.  The Court in AT&T has extended the preemptive power of the 
Communications Act beyond claims concerning only the actual regulated 
contractual agreement to claims that are merely related to the agreement.  
Communications companies currently regulated by the filed-rate doctrine of 
the Communications Act, as well as those that enter the industry in the future, 
may be tempted to test the waters at the edge of the decision, and rely on the 
Communications Act to shield them from state law tort claims. 
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